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Abstract: The state government of Rio de Janeiro has embarked on an ambitious policy of favela pacification in an 
attempt to gain control of territories long controlled by drug gangs. While I recognize the potential as well 
as the flaws of the Police Pacification Unit (UPP) program in terms of providing security for a city with a 
history of crime and violence, I argue that the UPP policy is an integral part of Rio’s entrepreneurial city 
strategy centered around the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. I see this as a case of what David 
Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession, where the state engineers the military conquest and control of 
territories, and the capture of assets by force, to create outlets for the expansion of private capital. Through 
a series of interviews with residents of “pacified” or soon to be pacified favelas, with police, community 
organizations, policy makers and researchers, and an analysis of the published sources, I identify four 
levels of capital accumulation that are facilitated by the UPP program. 
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ESTRATÉGIAS DE ACUMULAÇAO NEOLIBERAL E A MÃO VISÍVEL DA POLÍCIA 
PACIFICADORA NO RIO DE JANEIRO 
Resumo: O governo do estado do Rio de Janeiro iniciou uma ambiciosa política de pacificação das favelas na 
tentativa de ganhar o controle de territórios controladas ha muito tempo por traficantes. Embora reconheço 
o potencial, bem como as falhas do programa de Unidades da Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) em termos de 
proporcionar segurança para uma cidade com uma história de crime e violência, defendo que a política de 
UPP é parte integrante da estratégia do Rio de Janeiro como cidade empreendedora em torno da Copa de 
2014 e as Olimpíadas de 2016. Eu vejo isso como um caso do que David Harvey chama de acumulação 
por espoliação, onde o estado desenvolve a conquista militar e o controle de territórios, e a captura de 
ativos pela força, para criar saídas para a expansão do capital privado. Através de uma série de entrevistas 
com moradores de favelas "pacificado", ou prestes a ser pacificada, com a polícia, organizações 
comunitárias, decisores políticos e investigadores, e uma análise das fontes publicadas, identifico quatro 
níveis de acumulação de capital que são facilitadas pelo programa de UPP. 
Palavras-chave: Unidades da polícia pacificadora. Acumulação por espoliação. Mega-eventos. 
James Freeman 
 
REU, Sorocaba, SP, v. 38, n. 1, p. 95-126, jun. 2012  96 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Early one Sunday morning on November 2011, Rio’s men in black, the Special Police 
Operations Battalion (BOPE), rolled into Rio’s largest favela, Rocinha, in black-washed armored 
vehicles emblazoned with the special battalion's iconic skull and dagger logo to establish yet 
another Police Pacification Unit (UPP). Tight on the heels of the made-for-television spectacle
1
 
came another invasion. By Monday access to the ubiquitous pirated cable television system was 
disconnected, and the community soon filled with representatives of various cable companies, 
seated at tables every few meters on commercial streets and wandering the narrow alleys passing 
out pamphlets and signing up residents for new services (MENDES, MAGALHÃES, 
DAMASCENO, 2011).  As in other “pacified” favelas, television providers have been followed 
by the electric company, the water company, bank branches, chain stores and tourism. Housing 
prices in and around occupied favelas have risen anywhere from 50 to 400%, sometimes even 
before the police arrive. One commentator for MoneyWeek, in advising UK readers on 
investment in Brazil, wrote recently: “[I]f you were to ask me where I think the most money is 
going to be made in the coming years, I would say it's from the emergence and development of 
the favelas” (FRISBY, 2012). 
Rio’s 763 favelas house 22% of the city’s population (2010 census), but they have long 
been ignored by the state. They have always been a de facto housing solution for the poor where 
the formal market and governments have failed. Leftover land, often hills that were once of little 
value, were occupied first by returning soldiers from the Canudos military campaign in late 19th 
century, then by the urban poor displaced by turn of the century slum clearance programs, then 
by waves of rural migrants who came to Rio to build the high-rises, roads and bridges of Rio’s 
20th century modernization. The state has never taken full responsibility for these territories, 
except through sporadic interventions often motivated by populist electoral politics. Since the 
early 1980s, with the phasing out of the military dictatorship, armed drug gangs have filled the 
vacuum left by the state, exercising a mafia-like authority based on hierarchy, a strict code of 
                                                 
1
 Carta Capital reported that the police held off raising the Brazilian flag in Rocinha until after the Globo television 
network finished broadcasting the Formula One auto race. A gente se vê por aqui, 14 nov. 2011 (TARDÁGUILA, 
2010). 
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. This “parallel power” has in turn largely excluded the presence of the 
state, so that the police only enter in violent invasions or in connivance with drug gangs, and 
infrastructure projects and social interventions must be negotiated with and approved by 
traffickers.  
Gang control has long been central to the problems of everyday life in Rio’s favelas. But 
only when it came into conflict with elite accumulation strategies has the problem been seriously 
addressed. Following the example of the Barcelona Olympics of 1992, Rio embarked on an 
image construction and mega-event approach to urban development (VAINER, 2009). Like in the 
post-industrial cities of the North, Rio’s leaders, led by Mayor Cesar Maia (1993-1997, 2001-
2009), ran Rio as an entrepreneurial city (HARVEY, 1989a), competing with other cities around 
the world for increasingly mobile capital. Under Cesar Maia, Rio went through a series of urban 
beautification programs, such as Rio Cidade, which branded particular neighborhoods, and 
Favela Bairro, which redesigned the interface between favelas and the formal city. But the 
cornerstone of Rio’s strategy, and the Holy Grail in the entrepreneurial city competition, has been 
to host the summer Olympics. Rio bid unsuccessfully to host the 2004 and 2012 games before 
winning the right to host the 2016 Summer Olympics. Rio is also one of 12 Brazilian cities that 
will host the 2014 World Cup. International mega-events, such as the Olympics, are seen as a 
way to showcase a city, a kind of coming-out party, which will consolidate that city’s brand and 
leave a lasting impression on the world that will attract capital for years to come. The subtext is 
that such events also provide an opportunity for massive infrastructure investment and real estate 
speculation that by-passes normal political processes and produces what Carlos Vainer (2011), 
following Agamben (2005) calls a “city of exception”, where exceptions made for powerful 
interests become the rule. Typical of neoliberal governance, coalitions of business groups and 
politicians, along with representatives of international capital like the International Olympic 
Committee and FIFA, make local public policy decisions without public accountability 
(SWYNGEDOUW, 2010).  
                                                 
2
 Both Penglase (2008) and Dowdney (2003) stress that while drug gangs within particular favelas are hierarchically 
organized, each local gang is only loosely affiliated with a larger umbrella gang like the Comando Vermelho. 
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The contradiction between this mega-event accumulation strategy and the prevalence of 
outlaw territories became especially clear on October 17, 2009 when traffickers in the Morro dos 
Macacos favela shot down a police helicopter with a surface to air missile just two weeks after 
the announcement that Rio would host the summer Olympics of 2016. Morro dos Macacos is not 
far from Rio’s iconic Maracanã soccer stadium where both the final match of the 2014 World 
Cup and the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2016 Olympic are scheduled to be held. A US 
Embassy official commented in a cable released by Wikileaks, “The great question mark 
concerning Rio's selection has been the security situation, a question brought to the fore on 
October 17 as a gunfight between drug gangs resulted in the shooting down of a police 
helicopter” (KUBISKE, 2009). The media around the world highlighted the story and asked if it 
had not been a mistake to choose Rio. And Rio’s imagineers must have pondered the 
consequences of drawing the world’s attention to the city for two weeks in 2016 only to have 
violence break out in the middle of the games or to have the world’s journalists wandering a few 
short blocks from their hotels or game venues to favelas patrolled by heavily armed gang 
members.  
By the time of the Macacos incident, however, the UPP solution was already in the works. 
Three favelas had been occupied by the new community policing units and an expansion of the 
program had already been negotiated with the International Olympic Committee (SEGURANÇA 
NO RIO, 2010). A year later 12 UPPs had been established and the program was seen as so 
successful at solving the intractable problem of gang violence in favelas that Governor Sergio 
Cabral was easily re-elected in October 2010 due to the popularity of the initiative. As of this 
writing 19 UPPs have been inaugurated and two of Rio’s largest favela territories, Complexo do 
Alemão and Rocinha, have been occupied for the installation of future UPPs. 
While the UPP program has its merits and its flaws as a solution to the problems of 
chronic violence and the precarious condition of the urban poor in Rio, in this paper I argue that 
pacification of selected favelas in Rio is a necessary part of capital accumulation strategies at 
various scales. I see Rio’s favelas as territories with limited penetration of capital that represent 
potential outlets for surplus absorption through what David Harvey calls “accumulation by 
dispossession” (HARVEY, 2003; HARVEY, 2005b). Contrary to neoliberal free market 
ideology, the violence of state military power has always been essential in paving the way for 
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outwardly peaceful market based economic activity. While the idea of accumulation by 
dispossession has become popular among geographers in recent years, I argue that Harvey’s 
spatial and territorial insights have been overlooked. 
This research is based on interviews between August 2010 and July 2011 with residents, 
community leaders, NGO’s, police, public officials and researchers in and around nine 
communities with established or planned UPPs, in addition to an analysis of published accounts. I 
begin with a discussion of the literature on accumulation by dispossession, followed by a brief 
evaluation of the UPP strategy and then a discussion of four levels of capital accumulation that 
are enabled by favela pacification. 
ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION  
Accumulation by dispossession is a reworking of Marx’s concept of primitive 
accumulation. For Marx, capitalism was historically novel because it allowed for the capturing of 
economic surplus and the accumulation of wealth without direct violence. Under capitalism the 
capitalist starts with some initial capital, hires workers, buys machines and raw materials, puts 
those workers to work making commodities, and then sells the commodities and has more capital 
than he started with. The surplus value comes from the exploitation of those workers, but they are 
hired on the free market rather than coerced into working. The initial capital has grown during the 
production process and it can now be reinvested in the production of more commodities. Once 
you have workers who need to work for a wage in order to survive and capital to pay for labor 
and means of production this process can be repeated and capital can continue to accumulate. But 
Marx argued that some “primitive” or original accumulation needed to take place before this 
system of “expanded reproduction” could be set up. And that original accumulation was very 
violent. For Marx it was the “original sin” of capitalism that “is written in the annals of mankind 
in letters of blood and fire” (MARX, 1976, p. 875). 
Part of primitive accumulation was forcing peasants off their land and so separating them 
from the means of production so that they had no choice but to sell their labor to industrial 
capitalists in the city. The other part was the violent appropriation of the land and other values 
that could act as the initial capital to begin non-coercive capital accumulation. Much of this initial 
capital was plundered during the colonial enterprise. Marx famously wrote: 
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The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and 
entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of 
the conquest and plunder of India, the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the 
commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterize the dawn of the era 
of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive 
accumulation (MARX, 1976, p. 915). 
In Marx’s formulation this original accumulation belongs to the pre-history of capitalism. 
But Harvey argues that capitalism continues to require something akin to primitive accumulation, 
which he renames accumulation by dispossession (HARVEY, 2003; HARVEY, 2005b). Harvey 
has long argued that capitalism tends toward overaccumulation (HARVEY, 1982; HARVEY, 
1989b). The imperative of capitalism is to produce surplus value, and that surplus value must be 
continually reinvested. But there are limits to the ability of a particular productive system with a 
particular geography to absorb the surplus. Harvey sees neoliberalism as a class project to attack 
the structures of post-WWII Fordism, which enabled high rates of accumulation for 25 years, but 
had become constraints on further surplus absorption by the early 1970s (HARVEY, 2005a; 
HARVEY, 2010). Despite neoliberal ideals of reducing the role of the state, actually existing 
neoliberalism means using the coercive power of the state to appropriate values by forcing 
privatization, deregulation and the opening of markets, which constitute new rounds of enclosure 
of the commons reminiscent of 16th century England. 
Harvey also makes a spatial argument, that capitalism needs an “other”, a territory outside 
of itself that it can expand into through accumulation by dispossession. The history of European 
colonialism and imperialism can be seen in this light. Privatization and enclosure of the commons 
has been particularly productive in the periphery where it can be combined with a “spatial fix”--
the colonization of under-saturated territories for the investment of surplus capital or as markets 
for surplus commodities (HARVEY, 1989b). The neoliberal agenda championed by the IMF and 
the Washington consensus in the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America meant dispossessing urban 
workers of their industrial and government jobs, dispossessing peasants of their land, 
dispossessing citizens of public services and dispossessing societies of public goods like pension 
funds, utilities, telecoms and state run industries--all of which provided outlets for globally 
overaccumulated capital. 
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While much of the Third World remains territory that is undersaturated with capital, 
capitalism can also externalize territories for later colonization, much the way the system creates 
its own labor reserve by externalizing workers (MARX, 1976, p. 781-802; HARVEY, 2005b, p. 
140-143). I see this approach as complimentary to the rent gap theory of gentrification developed 
by Smith (1996, Ch 3), and useful as part of an explanation for uneven geographic development 
in general. Rio can be seen as a city that absorbed a lot of capital and was important for non-
coercive accumulation processes during the post WWII period and the economic miracle of the 
1960s and 1970s
3
, but then was devalued and subject to disinvestment and dispossession during 
the debt crisis and inflationary period of the 1980s and early 1990s. Favelas were important for 
social reproduction during growth periods, even as they remained largely outside circuits of 
accumulation, relying on unpaid family labor and communal “mutirão” labor. But they were 
further externalized during the period of devaluation as they absorbed externalized workers and 
became territories relatively autonomous from circuits of capital accumulation
4
. By the early 
1990s Rio was devalued and ready for urban scale neoliberal accumulation strategies.  
THE UPP SOLUTION 
In many ways the problem of violence in Rio’s favelas can be seen as a legacy of Brazil’s 
1964 to 1985 military dictatorship. Rio’s first organized drug gang emerged out of the 
dictatorship’s practice of mixing political prisoners, who robbed banks to finance their 
organizations, with other prisoners convicted of bank robbery. The Comando Vermelho was 
formed in the 1970s at the Cândido Mendes prison on Ilha Grande by regular prisoners who 
learned from imprisoned leftist guerrillas to organize themselves to confront adverse prison 
conditions. By the late 1970s and early 1980s the Comando Vermelho had extended its activities 
from bank robbery to controlling favela territories for the purpose of selling marijuana and 
cocaine (AMORIM, 1993; AZIZ; ALVES FILHO, 2003; DOWDNEY, 2003; PENGLASE, 
2008). The Comando Vermelho split into rival groups in the mid 1980s and their battles for 
control of favela territory have have brutalized favela life. 
                                                 
3
  Perlman (1976), for example, famously argues that favelas were not economically “marginal” during this period. 
4
 The lucrative drug trade can be seen as straddling the sphere of peaceful expanded reproduction and violent  
accumulation by dispossession. 
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The military dictatorship also consolidated a model of systematic police violence. Of 
course Rio’s police force was violent from its inception at the beginning of the 19th century 
(HOLLOWAY, 1993). In the 1960s autonomous units within the police were given a mandate to 
assassinate “bandits” in Rio’s favelas. When the police where placed under military control 
during the dictatorship such groups were incorporated into a violent strategy to oppress leftist 
opponents of the regime — the “internal enemy” — and were then redeployed against drug gangs 
and the urban poor with a return to civilian rule (VAN REENEN, 2004; RIBEIRO; DIAS; 
CARVALHO, 2008). As one commentator put it, “[...] there has never been a real and 
comprehensive rupture with the police strategies of the dictatorship (VIVES, 2012).”  
Poorly paid, poorly trained police, and traditions of corruption and impunity mean that 
police also extort money from traffickers and other residents. The latest evolution of these 
traditions is the rise of militias — gangs of retired and off duty police, firemen and prison guards 
who violently control favelas much the way drug gangs do, but for the purpose of extorting 
money by taxing informal transport, sales of cooking gas and real estate transactions, and 
charging local residents and businesses for protection (ZALUAR; CONCEIÇÃO, 2007).  
The government’s approach to solving these problems has often been a violent military 
one. In November 1994 the governor of Rio requested that the army occupy several of Rio’s 
favelas in response to a wave of drug related violence and middle class panic (RESENDE, 1995). 
And military invasion has been part of the current strategy adopted by the administration of 
Governor Sergio Cabral (2007 to present) and his secretary of public security José Mariano 
Beltrame to symbolically secure the city for a mega-event led neoliberal project. In early 2007 
the pair visited Colombia to understand the dramatic drop in homicides in Medellin and Bogotá. 
They came away with a recipe of massive military occupation of favelas combined with public 
works. In June 2007 they ordered 1300 state and federal police to surround the Alemão favela 
complex as part of a security strategy for the Pan-American Games (PAN), scheduled for mid 
July, and to lay the ground for the building of R$210 million cable car project modeled after a 
similar system in Medellin. In what came to be known as the “PAN massacre” the police and 
army invaded the favela on June 27, 2007 and killed at least 19 people, some of whom showed 
signs of having been summarily executed, according to an official investigation. Numerous 
people were injured, physically abused and had their civil rights violated as police shot 180,000 
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bullets and conducted door to door searches for drugs, weapons and traffickers in which property 
was stolen or intentionally destroyed (RIBEIRO et al., 2008; ALVARENGA FILHO, 2010).  
By the end of 2008 Sergio Cabral’s government hit on the formula it has pursued ever 
since. Instead of immediately occupying the largest favelas such as Alemão, seen then as the 
main stronghold of the Comando Vermelho, they would start gradually with some of the smaller 
favelas. The procedure was an initial invasion by BOPE to push out, kill or capture traffickers, 
capture arms and drugs, and then once the community was considered secure, turn it over to a 
new community policing unit which would indefinitely occupy the favela and prevent armed drug 
gangs from reclaiming the territory. The immediate predecessor for the UPP project was the 
Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais (GPAE), which was a pilot project in 
community policing begun in 2000 in the favela complex of Cantagalo, Pavão-Pavãozinho. It was 
the brainchild of a progressive military police colonel Carlos Magno Nazareth Cerqueira with the 
support of the NGO Viva Rio. The program was expanded to a handful of other favelas in 2002 
but was discontinued in 2004 (ALBERNAZ; CARUSO; PATRÍCIO, 2007).  
Cabral’s government modeled the UPP program after GPAE, but this time it would be 
fully implemented and it would have the political support it needed to survive. The three levels of 
government were aligned behind the project as they were united in the Olympic bid. The federal 
government under Lula would invest in large infrastructure projects through the Program for 
Accelerated Growth (PAC), such as the cable car in Alemão. The municipal government under 
Mayor Eduardo Paes, who took office in January 2009, would contribute a R$500 monthly pay 
bonus to UPP police officers and provide urbanization projects through the Morar Carioca 




One or more UPP bases are established in the favela, typically at the top of the hill in a 
strategic location for observing movement and often symbolically taking the place of drug gangs 
who used the same strategic locations. A typical unit has 100-250 soldiers, at a ratio of one per 
                                                 
5 The UPP program manages its image using a press office, a web site in Portuguese and English, a blog, a twitter 
feed, and charismatic young officers specially trained in media relations to command the various UPP units, such 
as Major Priscilla de Oliveira Azevedo, the first commander of the first UPP in Santa Marta, who became a symbol 
of the program. The media, researchers, foreign delegations and other “opinion makers” have been given broad 
access to the units in various favelas and to the officials of the program, and glowing media stories have 
proliferated in Brazil and abroad (TARDÁGUILA, 2010). 
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50-80 inhabitants. While the efforts of the police to mentor favela children has been well 
publicized by the UPP media machine, the main task of the police is to patrol the community and 
guard the entrances to prevent armed traffickers from reclaiming the territory. New recruits are 
trained for UPP units to bypass a culture of violence and corruption among the regular police. 
Officials make clear that they cannot completely eliminate the sale and use of illegal drugs, but 
that their job is to prevent the control of territory by armed gangs. Once a favela is pacified it can 
be administered by the state the way the rest of the city is so that residents can become full 
citizens. They also stress that policing paves the way for investment in infrastructure and the 
establishment of social programs to solve some of the other problems of the community. 
While opinions vary according to the profile of the community and the positions of 
different residents, in my interviews in seven favelas with established UPPs, residents were 
generally wary and critical of the program but admitted that on balance it has brought 
improvements. Residents cite the end of armed conflict between rival gangs and between gangs 
and police, the end of armed traffickers patrolling the community that set a bad example for 
children, a renewed freedom of movement and the end to the rule by arbitrary violence. On the 
other hand interviews with residents make clear that while the UPP police have been much less 
corrupt and violent than the ordinary police, it is far from true community policing. Residents 
mistrust the police and many avoid interacting with them because of past experience with police 
and because of fear that they will be marked as collaborators the day drug gangs return.  
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Many residents are cynical about the motivations behind the program, seeing it as a 
reelection project for Sergio Cabral and an effort to make a showing for the benefit of foreigners 
leading up to the World Cup and the Olympics. They wonder if the program will survive the next 
elections or past the 2016 Olympics. Many see the UPPs as simply a new gang that has taken the 
place of the old gang, replacing heavily armed traffickers with heavily armed police. Some 
complain of a rise in crime within the communities and argue that the “law of the traffic”6 was 
more efficient than the bureaucratic workings of the police and the state. They complain about 
the lack of participation, communication and democracy in the new order. And they agree with 
the official UPP line, that just police is not enough and that the real success of the program will 
depend on the social programs it makes way for, which most residents do not see much evidence 
of so far. 
On a different scale critics argue that the UPP program is designed as a security strategy 
for the World Cup and the Olympics, but does not address Rio’s broader security needs. The 
government established 19 UPPs by 2011, promises 40 by the 2014 World Cup and 100 by the 
2016 Olympics. UPPs are expensive. According to an interview with Beltrame in June 2011, each 
UPP soldier costs R$60,000 per year (the average UPP has 200 police). Currently the UPPs 
employ 3,771 police at an annual cost of about R$230 million. With 40 UPPs there would be 
8,000 UPP soldiers and an annual cost of R$480 million by the World Cup in 2014. With 100 
UPPs there would be 20,000 soldiers (HEARNE, 2009) and R$1.8 billion in annual expenditures 
(PAINO, 2011). Rio’s Military Police force was 38,872 before the UPP program. By 2016 the 
UPP would account for over a third of all police and more than a third of the state security 
budget, which was R$5 billion for 2010 (BASTOS, 2011). According to A. Oliveira (2011), 
Rio’s Olympic bid, which called for R$2.5 billion in security expenditures, apparently did not 
include UPP expenses. A bigger constraint than money is training new recruits fast enough to 
keep up with the time-table. The Complexo do Alemão was occupied by federal troops in 
November 2010 and is still waiting for the training of the projected 2,000 police who will be 
stationed at the eight new UPP units. Rocinha was occupied in November 2011 and will also 
need 2000 new UPP soldiers. 
                                                 
6 Penglase (2009) for a discussion of the “Law of the hillside”. 
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Even if the state is able to expand to 100 UPPs by 2016, the program will only provide 
security for a fraction of Metropolitan Rio’s more than 1,000 favelas and will not solve the 
problem of corrupt and ineffective policing in the rest of the city. Although officials sometimes 
deny the connection, UPPs seem to be located to provide security for the games. UPPs occupy 
favelas in the wealthy South Zone neighborhoods most likely to be frequented by tourists, around 
the central business district, near Olympic venues and along paths strategic for the games. 
Typical of neoliberal governance, public security policy has been crafted by and for particular 
private interests. 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN THE OLYMPIC CITY  
Regardless of its prospects for solving the problem of crime and violence for Rio’s 
inhabitants, the pacification of Rio’s favelas is essential to a set of neoliberal accumulation 
strategies. I will explore this at four levels: (1) the marketing of the games; (2) the business of 
building and preparing the mega-event city; (3) real estate valorization and (4) the favelas 
themselves as commodities and markets for commodities. 
 
1 Marketing the games 
The World Cup and the Olympics are big business, particularly for FIFA and the 
International Olympic Committee who profit from “marketing” the games, which the IOC divides 
into four areas: broadcasting rights, corporate sponsorship, product licensing and tickets to 
events. The biggest piece of this is broadcasting rights, which represents about half of the IOC’s 
marketing revenue, and has risen steadily over the years. The IOC received $17.8 million in 
broadcasting fees for the 1972 Munich Olympics, $286.9 million for the 1984 Los Angeles 
Olympics, $636 million for the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, $1.5 billion for the 2004 Athens 
Olympics and $1.74 Billion for the 2008 Beijing Olympics (COMMITTEE, 2012). Now with 
multi-event contracts comparisons are becoming more difficult, but US television network NBC 
recently agreed to pay $4.38 billion for US rights alone to the two winter and two summer games 
between 2014 and 2020. For the 2014-2016 period the IOC has already announced deals totaling 
$3.2 billion, compared to $3.9 billion for 2010-2012, and $2.6 billion for 2006-2008 
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(GROHMANN, 2011; SANDOMIR, 2011). FIFA Secretary General Jerome Valcke told 
Christopher Gaffney recently that FIFA expected R$3 to R$3.5 billion in revenue from the 2014 
World Cup (GAFFNEY, 2012). 
What the IOC is selling is spectacle and image (Broudehoux 2012). Cities use these 
events to brand themselves and construct an international image that will supposedly lead to 
years of returns on the investment
7
. FIFA and the IOC are selling this image of an exotic place as 
a backdrop for the drama of sport that seems to provide a compelling package to billions of 
viewers. Corporate sponsors like Coca Cola, Visa, McDonalds and General Electric associate 
their brands with the brand of the Olympics and the exotic brand of Rio de Janeiro, taking 
advantage of “adjacent attraction” like the juxtaposing of commodities and images in a shopping 
mall (CRAWFORD, 1992, p. 14-15). This sort of commodity fetishism goes back to the 
beginnings of industrial capitalism, where, for example, a shop in 19th century Paris displayed a 
mass produced pot against the background of a “Moorish harem” (SENNETT, 1977, p. 145). The 
way the Olympic brand and the brand of the city reinforce each other can be seen most clearly in 
Olympic licensing agreements, which produce endless items of clothing and souvenirs bearing 
the Olympic logo, the logo of those particular games and some other iconic representation of the 
host city. The local organizing committee for the 2016 games expects to sell R$2 billion worth of 
official merchandise in Brazil (ROGERO, 2012). 
But as with all commodity fetishism there is a danger that reality will spoil the carefully 
crafted illusion. In exchange for the value of an exotic location, organizers risk disruption by the 
dangerous classes. The case of Green Point stadium in the 2010 World Cup in South Africa is 
illustrative. Local organizers planned to renovate an existing stadium in a poor neighborhood of 
Cape Town to host the quarter-finals, thinking it could be used by residents after the games. FIFA 
insisted that the venue be transferred to the scenic Green Point location. One FIFA delegate told 
local organizers, “A billion television viewers don’t want to see shacks and poverty on this scale” 
(JOUBERT, 2007). If the main business of the games is broadcasting rights, the visual image of 
stadiums and their surrounding landscapes is of utmost importance.  
That is why much attention has been paid to Maracanã stadium in Rio, which will host the 
final match of the 2014 World Cup and the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2016 
                                                 
7 A growing body of scholarship disputes that this sort of branding is worth the costs (PREUSS, 2004; OWEN, 2005; 
GOLD; GOLD, 2008; COTTIE, 2011; OLIVEIRA, 2011). 
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Olympics. In Olympic promotional material Maracanã is always photographed from an angle that 
avoids showing the Mangueira favela in the background. A smaller favela adjacent to Maracanã, 
Favela do Metrô, is already being removed. The much larger and iconic Mangueira favela will 
not be removed, but it is being symbolically tamed by the mix of policies discussed above. 
Mangueira was occupied by the police in June 2011 and its UPP was inaugurated in November of 
the same year. Mangueira was the last major favela in the Tijuca area to be pacified, and so the 
UPP “closes the security perimeter” around Maracanã, as multiple news reports have noted 
(PINHEIRO, 2011). Fussey et. al. (2011, p. 2), in their book about the security of Olympic 
Games, write: "... defense of the spectacle has become the central feature of Olympic 
planning...". Like a handful of other key favelas, Mangueira will receive PAC and Morar Carioca 
projects, including a cable car. Captain Leonardo Nogueira, one of the more skillful and 
successful UPP commanders, has been transferred to Mangueira from his command of another 
strategic favela, Cantagalo, Pavão-Pavãozinho. As a central site in the symbolic geography of 
samba music Mangueira will gain a new samba school designed by Brazil’s most famous 
architect, 104-year old Oscar Niemeyer. And so while Mangueira will no doubt appear in the 
background of many World Cup and Olympic images, it will do so as a model favela complete 
with cable car, tastefully redesigned public spaces, multiple social programs and a certain 
thinning out of the population that will inevitably come with these various interventions. Most 
importantly the UPP symbolically transforms Mangueira from a dangerous threatening place into 
an exotic background that will facilitate capital accumulation. 
Marketing of the games is a good example of neoliberal governance, where decisions of 
public policy are made by business coalitions and international organizations like IOC and FIFA. 
These organizations have also mandated a de-democratization of Maracanã. Brazil’s most famous 
temple of soccer is closed to the public for several years of renovations. Stadium scholar 
Christopher Gaffney writes: “This will change forever the kind of place the Maracanã is as well 
as the kind of football played there” (GAFFNEY, 2011). A former 200,000 seat stadium with 
modest ticket prices, where every seat was a good seat, is becoming a 76,000 seat stadium with a 
hierarchy of VIP boxes and ticket prices that only the wealthy can afford. Brazilian laws that 
prohibit the sale of alcohol in stadiums are being overturned for the benefit of FIFA sponsor 
Budweiser. Citizens of Rio have been dispossessed of democratic decision making processes and 
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of their stadium. Mangueira has been dispossessed of a certain autonomy and many of its 
residents will be literally dispossessed of their homes.  
  
2 Building and preparing the mega-event city 
A second level of investment opportunities comes with preparing the city for the games. 
Olympic boosters argue that the games are a chance to improve infrastructure and revitalize 
neighborhoods. According to A. Oliveira (2011), Rio’s Olympic bid planned for R$29 billion in 
expenses, R$16.5 billion of which were to be public investment in infrastructure, but clearly 
much more will be spent. In preparation for the World Cup the government recently privatized 
the São Paulo, Campinas and Brasilia airports, selling the rights to run and profit from them for 
20 years to three different consortia made up of a collection of Brazilian and foreign companies 
for a total of R$24.5 billion. Rio’s airport will likely follow suit in the near future so that it can be 
upgraded to international standards in time for the games.  
But Rio is already in the midst of an orgy of construction. Besides the building of the 
Olympic facilities themselves, three new Bus Rapid Transit lines are being carved through the 
fabric of the city, requiring tunnels, bridges and the displacement of residents. A R$5 billion 
Metro extension is being built to connect the Barra region, where the main Olympic facilities will 
be located, to downtown by way of elite neighborhoods in the South Zone. As reported by N. 
Oliveira (2011), the major beneficiaries of all this work are the large Brazilian engineering and 
construction firms, like Odebrecht, which is carrying out the R$1 billion renovation of Maracanã 
for the World Cup. But there also seems to be a trickle down effect. O Globo newspaper reports a 
22% growth in the number of construction firms operating in Rio in 2011. One industry 
representative explained that “the revitalization of Rio’s downtown and the urban transport 
projects in the North and West Zones of the city multiplies the number of new developments and 
renovations of buildings, which only increases the market for large and small construction 
companies (HAIDAR, 2012).”  
The project that best illustrates the connection between neoliberal construction ventures 
and favela pacification is the Porto Maravilha port revitalization scheme. Since the beginning of 
the entrepreneurial turn in Rio’s management, the ruling class wanted to reclaim Rio’s derelict 
old port area, following the model of Barcelona, Buenos Aires and other cities which have turned 
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obsolete pre-container ports into leisure and consumptions spaces. While Cesar Maia’s efforts to 
build a Guggenheim museum as an anchor for port revitalization never got off the ground, the 
Olympics has provided an opportunity to recolonize this territory externalized from circuits of 
capital accumulation in an earlier period. While the port was not part of the original Olympic bid, 
once Rio was selected the city negotiated with the IOC to transfer a few minor Olympic functions 
to the port area, providing a pretext for pushing the long-standing port revitalization plan. One 
Porto Maravilha publicity text makes the classic entrepreneurial city argument: “The project aims 
to redevelop the port area increasing the city center attractiveness as a whole and enhances Rio’s 
competitiveness position in the global economy” (MARAVILHA, 2011).  
The plan is to raze 5 million square meters of devalued housing and industrial buildings 
and build 10 to 50 story office and elite residential towers anchored by world class science and 
art museums and new facilities for cruise ships. A technical operations center will be built for the 
Olympic Games, which will be transformed into a hotel and convention center afterwards. The 
media center and media housing for the games will be located here as well, and be transformed 
into mixed residential and commercial space. A new light rail system will be built to operate only 
within the Porto Maravilha area. The Perimetral, an elevated freeway at the water’s edge, will be 
dismantled in order to integrate the waterfront with newly redesigned public spaces, like in San 
Francisco and Boston.  
The management of the project is a textbook case of neoliberal governance. The five 
million square meters of mostly public land has been turned over to the consortium Porto Novo in 
a 15 year public private partnership. The law that authorized the PPP was passed without public 
scrutiny within weeks of Rio winning the Olympics. The text of the law detailing the 
requirements for companies bidding on the concession was almost identical to the text of the 
winning bid, as N. Oliveira (2011) wrote. Porto Novo, which is made up of three of Brazil’s 
largest engineering and construction firms — Odebrecht, Carioca Engenharia and OAS — will 
do the demolition and build the new infrastructure. They are also responsible for administering 
this privatized city within the city, providing urban services such as garbage collection and 
electricity.  
Funding for the project is provided through a novel financial instrument called 
Certificates of Additional Construction Potential (CEPACs), which seek to capture in advance the 
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increased property value created by the revitalization, so as to pay for the work. CEPACs 
represent the right to build above the legal height limit of four stories. On 13 June 2011 the city 
auctioned off 6.4 million CEPACs at R$545 each in a single lot for a total of R$3.5 billion. The 
winner and only bidder in the auction was the FGTS, the government run pension fund, which is 
controlled by the Caixa Econômica Federal, an enormous public bank. The FGTS will then be 
able to sell the CEPACs at a profit to individual developers who will build office and residential 
towers of 10-50 stories. In addition to the R$3.5 billion already paid, the FGTS has committed to 
completely fund the $8 billion in infrastructure planned for Porto Maravilha. Ironically FGTS 
funds, which represent the contributions of workers, are meant to be invested in social housing. 
According one analysis a square meter of residential or office space in the Porto will eventually 
have to sell for at least R$10,000 for a developer to make a profit, making it some of the most 
expensive real estate in Rio (JORGENSEN, 2011; See also http://www.portomaravilha.com.br).  
Porto Maravilha is thus a very speculative venture. Some large bets have been placed on 
this devalued part of town becoming prime real estate. But in order for that to happen the social 
character of the area will have to change as well. The Port area has 30,000 mostly poor residents. 
Many live in squats in abandoned buildings and are being systematically evicted. Looming over 
this real estate fantasy is Providência hill, with 5,500 residents. Providênica dates back to the late 
19th century and was the first informal settlement to bear the name “favela”. The community was 
settled in part by freed slaves and has housed generations of port workers. But like other favelas 
it has always been vilified by the authorities and the upper classes — motivated by a combination 
of racism and fear — even more so when it came under the domination of drug traffickers.  
In March 2010 the police occupied Providência for the purpose of establishing a UPP. 
The occupation took place during the UN World Urban Forum, which was being held nearby, 
where Rio’s planners where showcasing their urban renewal agenda to urban scholars and policy 
makers from around the world. The UPP was formally established a month later and drug dealers 
have been forced out of the community or underground. Providência is now being subjected to 
the full force of the current favela policy mix. Eight hundred houses have been marked in blue 
paint with the initials SMH — the Municipal Housing Agency’s sign of pending demolition. 
Residents say they came home from work to find the marks on their houses and now face an 
impenetrable bureaucracy in order to find out if and when they will actually be removed, and 
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where they will be relocated to if at all. This marking procedure has generated fear and often 
panic in favelas all over Rio. PAC and Morar Carioca projects for Providência include both a 
cable car system and a funicular, which seem to be designed to displace as many residents as 
possible. The main cable car station’s footprint will entirely cover Providência’s main plaza, a 
soccer court surrounded by shops and benches where community members gather to socialize and 
enjoy the spectacular view of the port. The new public spaces created around the new station, if 
carried out according to an “Olympic City” promotional video available on the internet, will 
displace hundreds of residents beyond the 800 already marked
8
. As a resident of Chapéu 
Mangueira told me in July 2011, “People here are afraid of Morar Carioca. You never know 
when your house will be marked.” 
Community activists have fought bitterly to block the projects. They say they were never 
consulted about the cable car and funicular plans, that they do not want or need them, and that the 
multi-million dollar investments do not address the most important issues facing the community, 
like jobs, education and healthcare. UPP soldiers have stepped in to protect workers and officials 
surveying the plaza. The protestors’ slogan, “cable car for whom?”, gets to the heart of the issue. 
The cable car has one line that connects to the main train station and another that connects to 
Samba City, an elite entertainment venue where floats for the city’s annual samba parade are 
built. Further connections may be made to the docks where cruise ships land and where the new 
Museum of Tomorrow will be built. The funicular would facilitate movement to Cruzeiro, the 
highest part of the community with a spectacular 360 view of Rio. In Cruzeiro all houses are 
marked for demolition and there are reports that the city plans to replace them with colonial style 
structures.  
Like Mangueira, Providência’s presence is disturbing but the community cannot be 
removed wholesale. Instead it is being symbolically tamed, beautified, thinned out and turned 
into a tourist attraction. The importance of the UPP in this package can be illustrated by a 
personal anecdote. In 2009 during a visit to Conceição Hill, a neighboring formal residential hill, 
a member of our group pointed out Providência Hill several hundred meters away. Another 
member of our group started to take a picture of Providência and a passing resident urged her 
stop. Lookouts from the drug gangs controlling Providência were known to shoot back with high-
                                                 
8 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5XuurqexaSA 
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powered rifles if they saw someone taking pictures, fearing police surveillance. Now imagine the 
Olympic City and Porto Maravilha without favela pacification. 
  
3 Real estate valorization 
While the Providência UPP is central to the speculative land values that underpin the port 
project, UPPs throughout the city can be seen as a reconquest of devalued urban space for the 
accumulation of real estate capital. With each new pacification euphoric articles appear in the real 
estate sections of various publications.  
When the military occupied Rocinha, Rio’s largest favela, along with the neighboring 
favela of Vidigal on 13 November 2011, Veja Rio celebrated the effects on real estate in São 
Conrado, the surrounding elite beach neighborhood: “Among all the areas that have had favelas 
pacified, São Conrado is the one that is most likely to benefit from this type of intervention, 
because it is a case of a bridging area between the South Zone and Barra da Tijuca, with very 
high real estate valorization potential” (BRISO; CERQUEIRA, 2011). São Conrado is on a 
picturesque strip of shoreline, with beautiful beaches, residences of some of Brazil’s rich and 
famous, Rio’s most prestigious golf course and top international hotels like the Sheraton. But 
guests at the Sheraton tend to avoid the beach just below the hotel because it is used by residents 
of the favela of Vidigal and considered dirty and dangerous. The hotel symbolically pulls up the 
beach access stairway at 5 pm every night.  
In August 2010 a group of heavily armed traffickers, surprised by the police on their way 
back to Rocinha from a party in Vidigal, invaded the Intercontinental Hotel and held 35 guests 
and staff members hostage for several hours, delaying the Rio marathon that was scheduled to 
start from the hotel. With the pacification of Rocinha, the Intercontinental has begun a R$25 
million renovation and is changing its name, no doubt to lose the association with the events of 
August 2010. By the time of the occupation of Rocinha, real estate in São Conrado was going for 
R$10,000 per square meter, compared to R$15,000 in Ipanema and Leblon. And prices had 
already risen 50% in the previous year, in anticipation of the occupation. Real estate agents are 
now expecting São Conrado to at least catch up with Ipanema and Leblon, and several major 
luxury condo buildings are being constructed. The prestigious São Conrado Fashion Mall 
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shopping center has announced a R$50 million renovation and plans to open the first Ferrari 
dealership in Latin American in 2012 (BRISO; CERQUEIRA, 2011). 
Tijuca is another area that has particularly benefited from the UPP project. Tijuca is a 
traditional middle class neighborhood in an inland valley surrounded by mountains, which are 
largely occupied by favelas. As one real estate agent explained, “Tijuca is a middle step in the 
real estate ladder. People moving up socially move to Tijuca, and people priced out of the South 
Zone move to Tijuca” (Author’s  interview, July 2011). My interviews and media reports agree 
that real estate values had been depressed for many years in “Greater Tijuca” because of crime, 
violence and a general sense of insecurity. The first favela occupied in the Tijuca area was the 
Morro do Borel in April 2010. Other favelas followed in short succession. The implantation of an 
UPP in Macacos in November 2010, where the police helicopter had been shot down, was 
symbolic, as was the occupation of Mangueira in November 2011, which completed the 
pacification of the Tijuca favelas. Veja Rio reported, “The occupation of Mangueira, last Sunday, 
closes the security perimeter around the favelas of Greater Tijuca. In the wake of pacification, 
begun a little over a year ago, the neighborhood, surrounded by favelas, is the one that most 
benefits from the Police Pacification Unit policy” (RITTO, 2011). 
My July 2011 canvassing of the Tijuca area certainly gave the impression of a real estate 
boom. Real estate agents roamed the streets inserting flyers in mail boxes. Senior citizens sitting 
on benches and playing checkers at the Saens Peña plaza reported aggressive agents trying to get 
them to sell their houses. Taxi drivers gushed about the decline of crime in the area. And real 
estate agents spoke of a 60 to 100% increase in prices in the past year. Ivan Simões of Solução 
Imobiliária explained, “The UPPs changed a lot of things. There are no more muggings. It’s 
complete tranquility right now. The Saens Peña plaza has changed completely. Now there is 24-
hour policing. You don’t have those people who sleep in the plaza anymore (Author’s Interview, 
July 2011).” Veja Rio, in an article written around the time of my interviews, reported prices 
going from R$2,800 to R$5,500 per square meter in a year (RITTO, 2011).  
Real estate immediately adjacent to pacified favelas has been affected even more strongly. 
One real estate agent told the newspaper O Dia, “Near the Morro dos Macacos, apartments that 
were worth R$30,000 before are now selling for R$200,000” (ARAÚJO; BOECHAT, 2011). But 
many people I spoke to stressed that good apartments did not have views of a favela. Ivan Simões 
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gave the example of an apartment in Grajaú, near the Andaraí favela complex. The 120 square 
meter newly-renovated apartment was being offered for R$220,000 because it was facing the 
“community”, and the owners were going to have a hard time selling. Without a view of the 
pacified favela it would easily sell for R$450,000 (Author’s interview, july 2011).  
The case of Cantagalo, Pavão-Pavãozinho, a complex of favelas on the border between 
Ipanema and Copacabana illustrates the dynamic of favela adjacent property. In 1999 I conducted 
a series of interviews with elite neighbors of the Cantagalo favela in Ipanema. Many neighbors of 
the favela were bitter about the effect the favela had on their property values, particular those 
with views of the community. In the 1990s Cantagalo was going through a period of instability 
with different drug gangs fighting for control, regular police invasions, and shootouts that would 
last for hours. Neighbors complained about the risk of stray bullets. Some had bricked up terraces 
and windows or condemned certain rooms in their apartments. Others complained that friends 
would refuse to visit them. Some people said they would like to move, but would never be able to 
find a buyer and could never get a price that would allow them to buy an equivalent apartment 
away from the favela. One informant lived in a penthouse apartment on two floors with a 
swimming pool overlooking the entrance to Cantagalo. She bought the apartment with her 
husband in 1972 the year it was built with the expectation that the favela would be removed 
because removal was the policy at the time and nearby favelas had recently been eradicated 
(PERLMAN, 1976). She remembered passing a petition around the building asking for the 
removal of the favela. “The idea was to remove the favela... It was my bad luck. Imagine the 
value of my apartment if the favela had been removed and the hill was landscaped like 
Catacumba is today (FREEMAN, 2002, p. 207). 
Cantagalo, in the middle of some of the most desirable real estate in Brazil, was one of the 
favelas occupied by the army in 1994 at the behest of elite public opinion which wanted a 
vigorous response to drug gangs and their impact on elite quality of life. Cantagalo was also the 
subject of the first experiment with community policing under GEPAE in 2000. On November 
30, 2009 the community was occupied by BOPE and a month later it became the fifth favela to 
receive a UPP. It has also been subject to the same package of measures applied in Providência 
and Mangueira (CUNHA, 2011), which seem particularly focused on the key real estate variable 
of visibility. The entrance to Cantagalo at Texiera de Melo street was long a sore point for middle 
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class Ipanema as a place where the disorder of the favela seemed to spill out into the formal 
neighborhood. It was a staging ground for beach and street vendors, housed favela oriented bars 
and had a disorderly appearance. Middle class neighbors avoided the corner and warned of the 
dangers of stray bullets and muggings. At the top of the stairs that ascended from the street was a 
lucrative boca de fumo (drug selling spot) with an unsavory clientele.  
By the time of the UPP inauguration the State Government together with Metrô Rio was 
already transforming the Teixeira street entrance. Throughout 2009 work was done on a new 
Ipanema Metro station and one of the entrances to the Metro would be at the foot of Cantagalo 
hill. On 30 June, 2010 the R$48 million station with a 64 meter high elevator was inaugurated. 
Built by Odebrecht, the elevator was meant to help favela residents move between the metro and 
the top of the favela. The effect however is a facelift for an unsightly corner of Ipanema. The 
dramatic blue and white elevator shaft, which lights up in multiple colors at night, dominates 
where it does not completely hide the view of the favela from street level and from neighboring 
apartment buildings. The clean new station completely displaces the former disorder. Young 
middle class tourism students, in brightly colored favela motif t-shirts, representing Rio Top 
Tour, the State Governments favela tourism initiative, are posted at the entrance to the station. 
Their job is to encourage tourists to take the elevator ride to the “Lookout of Peace”, for 
spectacular views of Ipanema that were once the sole privilege of favela residents.  
Meanwhile in neighboring Pavão-Pavãozinho the SMH has been busy marking housing 
for demolition. On 21 July 2011 Alzira Barros, President of Pavão-Pavãozinho Residents’ 
Association presented a map of the city’s survey on “areas of risk” to a room full of distressed 
residents. In the wake of flooding and landslides in April 2010 the city (GeoRio - Fundação 
Instituto de Geotécnica do Município do Rio) carried out a survey of favela areas which might be 
at risk for future landslides. In Pavão-Pavãozinho the risk map shows the entire upper part of the 
community in red and subject to removal. While the houses in the area are generally poorer and 
less substantial, and some probably are at risk, many of the houses are solidly constructed and 
have survived many years of rain. Conspiracy theories run rampant, but one thing is clear: the 
ambiguity of the government’s intentions for the area and a lack of clear communication has 
caused much anxiety (CUNHA, 2011). The real risk seems to come from the city’s designation of 
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the area, which happens to be the portion visible from the beach. Real estate prices in the 
formerly devalued part of Ipanema near the favela have soared. 
 
4 Favelas as commodities and as markets for commodities 
Pacified favelas also represent potential new markets for commodities, and formal 
businesses including large multi-national firms have been quick to colonize these newly won 
territories. According to a representative of FIRJAN, Rio’s Chamber of Commerce, “This good 
moment for the state of Rio de Janeiro began with the pacification of the favelas in 2008. The 
reclaiming of these territories formerly hostile to formal businesses is opening ever more markets 
for large chains and small entrepreneurs” (HAIDAR, 2012). Already at the beginning of the UPP 
program the economic potential was clear. In September 2009, an official from the US Consulate 
in Rio wrote in a cable released by WikiLeaks, “there are also significant economic interests at 
stake, with some analysts estimating Rio de Janeiro's economy would grow by 38 billion 
Brazilian Reals ($21 billion USD) should favelas be reincorporated into mainstream society and 
markets (HEARNE, 2009).” The official goes on to conclude, “bolstered by private enterprise 
lured by the prospects of reintegrating some one million favela residents into mainstream 
markets, this program could remake the social and economic fabric of Rio de Janeiro (HEARNE, 
2009).” 
One of the primary direct beneficiaries of favela pacification is Light, Rio’s privatized 
electric company. Residents of Rio’s favelas make illegal connections to the electrical grid, as 
they do to other services like cable televisions, water and sewage. In some favelas drug gangs or 
militias charge a small flat fee for illegal access. Light was privatized in 1996 and is controlled 
by a group of Brazilian, US and French electric companies. The US Consulate official writes, 
“According to Andre Urani, an economist with the Institute of Labor and Social Research (IETS), 
Light loses at least 200 million USD per year due to pirated electricity in the favelas. 
Emphasizing the potential market in favelas, Urani stated, “Imagine the revenue increase if Light 
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While Light has made efforts to formalize electricity in favelas in the past, only with 
pacification have they shown significant success. Light reported in January that its receipts in the 
favela of Santa Marta, pacified since December 2008, are up 5,437% and that the vast majority of 
illegal connections have been formalized in the first seven UPP favelas (Lima, 2012). With the 
occupation of Rocinha, Light expects to increase its revenue in the community from R$3.2 
million to R$24 million per year (LEITE, 2011). 
Light reports that it invested R$56 million in formalizing electrical connections in favelas 
from 1999 to 2010, R$38 million of which was in 2010 (LIGHT, 2012). Light rewires the 
community and installs new meters. An army of representatives goes door to door signing 
residents up for accounts, and teaching them about their “rights and responsibilities” and about 
conserving energy. Part of Light’s program for favelas, Efficient Community, is to educate 
people who have never had to conserve electricity, so that their bills are actually payable. People 
are taught not to leave lights on and to take special care with air-conditioning units. The company 
has also widely publicized its program of offering free compact florescent light bulbs and free 
energy efficient refrigerators in favelas, and reports they have exchanged 487,976 light bulbs and 
31,430 refrigerators between 1999 and 2010, 70% of which was in 2010 (LIGHT, 2012). 
Speaking with residents of Santa Marta in July 2011 many accepted the argument that 
having an official Light connection meant better service and more rights as citizens and 
consumers. An electrical bill can be used as proof of residency which can be useful for acquiring 
other documents and even for obtaining consumer credit. Others complained of erroneous bills 
that consume their entire income, with little recourse but to pay or have their service immediately 
cut. The typical bill was R$50 to R$100 per month, or 10-20 percent of minimum wage. One man 
invited me into his sparse windowless basement apartment to show me his Light bill of R$575 for 
a single month. With only three light bulbs to power, the bill is more than he makes as bricklayer. 
He said the company required him to pay the bill before they would investigate a possible error. 
Light does offer introductory rates in favelas, and special rates for those who fall below a certain 
poverty threshold, but residents say more accommodation needs to be made for poorer families. 
Several companies compete to offer services in pacified favelas to replace illegal cable 
television connections. Embratel and Sky offer cable television under the special UPP brands Via 
Paz and Sky UPP respectively. TIM, a cellular provider, is offering a special high-speed Wi-Fi 
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service beginning in Rocinha (LEVIN, 2011). In Santa Marta residents told me they paid R$20 
per month for pirated cable before the UPP and that now there were a variety of packages 
available from different providers and that the price depended on how many televisions in the 
house and which channels. The basic package was R$60/month, but that did not include premium 
channels for movies and sports. With the occupation of Rocinha Embratel announced a new 
package for UPP communities at the discounted introductory rate of R$29.90/month plus R$50 
for installation, with a schedule for catching up to rates charged in the rest of the city over time 
(LEVIN, 2011). 
Retail in pacified communities is being transformed as well. In July 2011 ATM machines 
had just been installed in Providência and Santa Marta, which residents commented would not 
have been possible prior to occupation. Shortly before the occupation, Rocinha, which has always 
had vibrant commerce, had two long standing bank branches (ITAU and Caixa), a brand new 
Bradesco branch and a Banco do Brasil branch under construction. Casas Bahia, an appliance and 
furniture store, and part of a retail group with R$40 billion in annual sales, is planning on opening 
stores in Rocinha, Complexo do Alemão and Cidade de Deus, and intends to continue following 
the path of pacified favelas (CAMAROTTO, 2011).  
Residents in Santa Marta spoke of the hot commercial real estate market around the Praça 
do Cantão, where all the buildings have been painted in vibrant pastel colors by a pair of Dutch 
artists. They expected a branch of Casa & Video, a large house-ware chain, soon. Cellular 
telephone companies Telemar and Oi were also said to be shopping for storefronts in the area. 
And all of the small local bars and restaurants around the plaza have recently entered into 
sponsorship agreements with Ambev, the largest beer company in Latin America and a subsidiary 
of Anheuser-Busch. Ambev has provided uniform blue signs displaying the names of the bars and 
the Ambev logo, help improving the facades of the various bars and free refrigerators in 
exchange for exclusively carrying Ambev products. In general residents were enthusiastic about 
the retail developments, but one small local clothing boutique owner just off the plaza 
commented that she would be out of business the day Lojas Americanas, another house-ware 
chain, opened a branch in Santa Marta. 
The UPPs have also facilitated the commodification of the favelas themselves. One of the 
promises of the UPP program was that it would bring jobs and opportunities for residents, and 
James Freeman 
 
REU, Sorocaba, SP, v. 38, n. 1, p. 95-126, jun. 2012  120 
 
tourism is possibly the only concrete manifestation of that promise. While jeep tours of Rocinha 
date back to the 1992 Earth Summit, the UPPs have caused a mini-boom in favela tourism. 
Favelas have always been exotic and exciting to foreign visitors. Now that the most accessible 
ones near the South Zone beaches are also safe, tourists are eager to climb the hill. Jeep tours, 
that mostly contract through travel agencies and hotels, continue to visit Rocinha, but have 
branched out to Santa Marta, which is the most popular favela with tourists. Representatives of 
Rio Top Tour wait near the entrance of the favela offering maps and encouragement, in English, 
Spanish and Portuguese, to would-be visitors. Tourists entering the community first encounter the 
colorful and inviting Praça do Cantão. Signs in English and Portuguese direct them to the 
funicular, inaugurated in 2008, which can take them to the top of the community. Signs 
encourage visitors to take photographs. Santa Marta is possibly the only community with a tourist 
attraction other than the view: The Michael Jackson statue, erected on the spot where Michael 
Jackson filmed the music video “They Don’t Care About Us” in 1996. 
Favela residents have mixed feelings about tourists. Many complain that they do not bring 
much money to the community and that most opportunities are created for outsiders. Everyone I 
spoke to disdained the jeep tours, and tourists wandering on foot through alleys taking pictures 
can be invasive in communities where the division of public and private space is not well defined. 
On the other hand, local merchants see the opportunity to sell drinks, snacks and the occasional 
meal, and a few restaurants oriented to outsiders are starting to appear. Rio Top Tour employs 
one local guide in Santa Marta. In Cantagalo most tourists simply take the elevator ride to the 
viewpoint, but a local initiative called Museum of the Favela gives a tour of a series of murals in 
the complex. Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira have a tour guide cooperative, which takes 
visitors on a nature trail to the site of the 1959 film Black Orpheus, with its spectacular views.  
A series of hostels have opened in the South Zone favelas of Vidigal, Cantagalo and 
Chapéu Mangueira to offer cheaper, exotic accommodations to young foreign backpack tourists 
(SERÓDIO, 2011). These are small-scale private initiatives mostly run by foreigners living in 
Rio, although the Chapéu Mangueira “Favela Inn” is run by local residents. Locals in these 
favelas also rent out roof top terraces with stunning views for parties. While there are signs that 
favela tourism is creating some opportunities for locals in a few key South Zone communities, 
tourism will never be very attractive in the majority of Rio’s favelas. And outsiders will most 
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likely profit from tourism as the UPP project consolidates. The most important tourism initiatives 
are Rio’s larger entrepreneurial strategy, which depends more on a symbolic taming of the 
favelas, and the transformation of Providência, which can be seen as pacification through 
tourism. 
Finally there has been a real estate boom within favelas with UPPs. A study by the 
Getúlio Vargas Foundation concluded that rents in pacified favelas rose 7% faster than rents for 
the city as a whole in the last three years (ALTA… 2011). Three days after the invasion of 
Rocinha newspapers reported that prices of favela houses had gone up 50%. In my survey of 
favelas with UPPs residents spoke of prices for a two-bedroom apartment doubling from 
R$25,000 to R$50,000. I heard many stories of foreigners buying or renting in favelas and of 
people from the formal neighborhood moving up the hill to save money. 
The consequence of these changes, as various branches of capital colonize the favelas, is 
an increased cost of living and the beginnings of gentrification. With higher rents and new utility 
bills, some are finding the UPP favelas, particularly those in the South Zone, too expensive and 
are moving to cheaper, more remote communities (LEITE, 2011).  
CONCLUSIONS 
The state is finally asserting its monopoly of legitimate violence in territories that have 
been largely ignored by public power from their first inhabitation. This is a necessary step that 
should have been taken long ago. But the process is flawed because it follows the logic of 
neoliberal governance. Instead of being a security strategy for the whole city, the UPP initiative is 
a security strategy dictated by the needs of the games, construction companies, real estate 
interests and those who see favelas as potential markets. Decisions are made behind closed doors 
with a lack of transparency, participation or democracy at every level down to the daily functions 
of the UPPs in communities.  
But the UPP project is fundamental for a set of neoliberal accumulation strategies 
centered around the entrepreneurial city. While much of the transformation of Rio is articulated 
in terms of public-private partnerships and the agency of private capital, the role of the state in 
facilitating private capital accumulation has never been clearer. The state is always the agent of 
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accumulation by dispossession. Capital accumulation by non-coercive means has its limits, and 
the role of the state has long been to conquer and control territories militarily and appropriate 
assets to create new fields of operation for private capital. As Harvey argues, capital requires an 
outside to expand into. The formerly colonized world has always served this function. Latin 
America, Brazil, Rio de Janeiro and Rio’s favelas have also been territories that have been 
externalized from the main global circuits of capital accumulation and devalued at different 
times, making them available for later re-colonization and re-valuation.  
Now the moment of some of Rio’s favelas has come. The IOC, FIFA, and top global 
companies like McDonalds and Visa, require pacified favelas in the background of the exotic Rio 
image they need to pollinate their brands. Major real estate developers, pension funds and large 
engineering and construction firms require pacified favelas to valorize stadiums, CEPACs and 
office towers. Smaller developers, real estate speculators and a broad middle class of home 
owners require pacified favelas to grow their capital. And utilities, commodity producers and 
merchants require pacified favelas to expand the markets for their commodities. 
But this sort of capital accumulation requires a certain dispossession. The citizens of Rio 
are being dispossessed of the political process of deciding security, transport and urban planning 
policy in general. And they are being dispossessed through the privatization of a large section of 
the city in the port area. Favela communities, although they are relieved of the insidious influence 
of drug gangs, are also dispossessed of a certain autonomy, self-determination and democracy in 
running community affairs. And too many of the urban poor are being dispossessed of their 
homes through gentrification and a policy of selective removal. 
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